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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the United Nations has frequently been criticized for
responding too slowly to problems in the developing world, it can take
pride in having been among the first to recognize the crisis of antipersonnel landmines. Ever since the issue was first raised in 1992 by the
International Committee of the Red Cross, key actors at the United
Nations-including the Secretary General and other senior executives
in the departments of Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Affairs, the High
Commissioner on Refugees, and UNICEF-have been forthright on
the need to take action against this problem.' The brief but specific
mention of landmines in the Secretary General's 1992 Agenda for Peace
served as an early-but hardly premature-wake-up call to the world
that the problem of landmines was out of control. 2 These U.N. organs
deserve credit for helping to identify and bring to public attention an
issue of such importance to the developing world.
The United Nations' work has been undertaken in conjunction with
the efforts of various governments and a worldwide campaign by a
coalition of nongovernmental organizations. Still, it is too early to say
if any of this will lead to effective controls on the spread of landmines,
* General counsel, Soros Foundations, New York, and John Harvey Gregory Lecturer on World
Organization, Harvard Law School; formerly director of the Human Rights Watch Arms Project.
** Member, clinical law faculty, and co-director, Human Rights Clinic, St. Mary's University
Law School, San Antonio, Texas; formerly counsel to the Human Rights Watch Arms Project.
Mr. Anderson and Ms. Schurtman were two principal editors of HumAN RIGHTS WATCH ARMS
PROJECT AND PHysiCaANs

FOR HumAN RIGHTS, LANDMINEs: A DEADLY LEGACY (Kenneth

Anderson etal. eds., 1993).
1. As used in this discussion, the term "landmines" refers solely to antipersonnel landmines,
rather than anti-vehicle and anti-tank landmines and sea mines. These non-antipersonnel mines
pose risks of their own that are not addressed here.
2. Report of the Secretary General: Agenda for Peace, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/277
(1992).
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or to widespread removal of mines already in place. Current discussions
and proposals seem likely to result at best in half-measures that will
salve the consciences of leading nations without actually doing anything about the problem. Yet the landmines issue has been raised in
many diverse settings, including diplomatic conferences, U.N. bodies
and agencies, legislative and executive branches of national governments, the world's militaries (both regular and irregular), arms exporters (both private and state-owned), the media, and the worldwide
public. Landmines are, if nothing else, the subject of intense international discussion.
Policy proposals for solving the landmines crisis are equally wideranging. The major options include: doing nothing; attempting to
remove mines from severely mined zones (without necessarily addressing the problem of supply); strengthening existing international law
governing the "proper" use of mines in warfare; creating an international export control regime focused on supply; employing technological "fixes" to lessen the risk posed by mines by neutralizing their time
delay mechanisms; and imposing a complete ban on production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of landmines.
The purpose of this Symposium Article is to show briefly how and
why landmines are a crisis in the developing world, sketch out the
various responses of the United Nations and other actors, and assess
whether these responses are likely to alleviate the problem. Our reluctant conclusion, as participants in the non-governmental organizations'
campaign on landmines, is that current "official" efforts to solve the
problem-both by the U.N. and by various sovereign actors-will be
largely unsuccessful, regardless of the many good intentions put down
on paper. We urge, as does the Secretary General, that a complete ban
on the production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of landmines be
imposed as soon as practicable, and we hope to address in passing why
this proposal does not partake of hopeless utopianism.
II. THE LANDMINES CRISIS
The developing world is beset with so many serious problems that
it is fair to ask why landmines constitute a crisis of sufficient urgency
to be placed ahead of other dilemmas in the affected regions. 3 Cambo3. The background discussion on landmines in this section is drawn from and consistent with
the following standard sources on landmines: HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH AND PHYSICIANS FOR
HuMAN RIGHTS, LANDmINES: A DEADLY LEGACY (Kenneth Anderson et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter DEADLY LEGACY]; CLEARING THE FIELDS: SOLUTIONS TO THE GLOBAL LAND MINES
CRISIS (Kevin M. Cahill ed., 1995) [hereinafter CLEARING THE FIELDS]; BUREAU OF POLITICALMILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, HIDDEN KILLERS: THE GLOBAL PROBLEM WITH
UNCLEARED LANDMINES (1993) [hereinafter HIDDEN KILLERS I]; BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, HIDDEN KILLERS: THE GLOBAL PROBLEM WITH UN-
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dia and Afghanistan have become the best-known cases of landmine
infestation, and it is sometimes thought that these two countries
represent the bulk of the tragedy, but this is a grave misconception.
Landmines are already a problem in about sixty countries, and a severe
problem in about twenty of these, as measured by the extent of the
threat they pose to daily activities. 4 These countries are located mostly
in the developing world, and include some of the world's poorest
nations. The region with the largest concentration of mines is Africa;
eighteen countries in Africa have some 18-30 million mines.5 The
United Nations estimates that there may be as many as 200 million
6
landmines emplaced in at least sixty-two countries worldwide.
Moreover, landmines infestation is growing in many countries around
the world, in some places at a frightening rate. Rwanda, for example,
has witnessed the development of an extremely serious landmines
problem in just the last few years. 7 In a newly updated survey of the
extent of the landmines problem, appropriately titled Hidden Killers,
the U.S. State Department has recently emphasized that the worldwide
problem is getting worse. 8 Not only is the absolute number of emplaced landmines increasing, but some commentators believe (notwithstanding the difficulty in obtaining reliable data) that emplacement is
occurring at an accelerating rate across an ever more diverse range of
countries. 9 As the number of internal wars (where landmine use is often
highly prevalent) increases around the globe, this trend is becoming
more and more pronounced. 10
Landmines kill and maim a significant number of people each year.
In Hidden Killers II, the U.S. State Department estimated that 500
CLEARED LIANDMINES (1994) [hereinafter HIDDEN KILLERS II]; and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The
Landmine Crisis: A HumanitarianDisaster, FoREiGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 8. Several of these
publications, such as DEADLY LEGACY, contain extensive bibliographies of literature on landmines, both general and specialized.
4. The most severely affected countries and regions at present are: Afghanistan, Angola,
Burma, Cambodia, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Falkland Islands, Georgia, Iran, Iraq (especially
Iraqi Kurdistan), Kuwait, Mozambique, Nagorno-Karabakh, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan,
Thailand, Vietnam, Western Sahara, and the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia).
Kenneth Anderson, An Overview of the Global Landmines Crisis, in CLEARING THE FIELDS, supra
note 3, at 17, 214 nA. This list will certainly shift over time as mining activities change and as
more information is gathered. It should be noted that as landmines studies have only systematically taken place since about 1992, figures of emplacement and injuiry, as well as production and
export figures, are constantly being revised, generally upwards. Many of the research groups, such
as Human Rights Watch, periodically will publish updates with more recent figures; it is more
likely than not that figures in this Article that are current for 1995 will have been revised within

one to two years.
5. Id. at 18.
6. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 3, at 3 & n.2.
7. HIDDEN KILLERS II, supra note 3, at 16.
8. HIDDEN KLLERs II, supra note 3, at v.
9. HIDDEN KLLERS II, supra note 3, at 1.
10. Anderson, supra note 4, at 19.
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people are killed or maimed each week by landmines. 11 It appears that
a sizable majority of the victims are civilians, including many children.
Yet these 25,000 annual victims of landmine explosions, while
disheartening, do not even represent the whole picture. The true crisis
lies in the secondary effects of mines. Solving the landmines problem
is often a precondition, sometimes a nearly insurmountable one, to
solving many other problems of a developing country seeking to move
12
forward in the aftermath of armed conflict.
The social and economic cost to a developing country of having a
large number of amputees and other disabled victims of landmines is
staggering. Developing countries tend to be agricultural societies where
life is already at the margin; landmine victims will rarely be economically productive, and the resulting drag on production and investment
in societies seeking to promote ordinary economic activities after wartime is immense and debilitating.
In areas that have some health care facilities, the burden of treating
mine victims often swamps their capabilities. Indeed, the attention of
the International Committee of the Red Cross was first drawn to
landmines by its war surgeons operating in the field, who were becoming alarmed and disgusted by the ever-increasing number of civilian
mine victims arriving in their field hospitals. 13 A mine amputation is
expensive and difficult; the nature of the wound caused by stepping
on a mine, which tends to drive infectious material high up into the
leg, often requires not one, but a whole series of ever-higher amputations.14 In an ideal setting, these operations would be followed by
physical therapy and prosthetic devices. But in poorer countries, "rehabilitation for what?" remains a real question for those who must
allocate scarce resources for social services.
Yet this is only the first ripple in the interconnected costs of landmines. Nearly all the wars of the developing world leave significant
numbers of refugees, who must return home in order to make a
functioning peace and a functioning post-war society. Emplacement of
mines on their land can render this return impossible. But even when
they do return home, refugees are often unable to recommence farming
activities because of the risks of mines. Returning refugees thus become a drain on food supplies when they otherwise might soon become
self-sufficient and be able to provide a surplus to help feed others.
11. HIDDEN KiLLERs II, supra note 3, at 2.
12. See generally DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 3, at 117.
13. Interviews with International Committee of the Red Cross staff members, in Geneva,
Switzerland (1992).
14. See generally Robin Coupland & A. Korver, Injuries from Antipersonnel Landmines: The
Experience of the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross, 303 Brr. MED. J. 1509 (1991) reprinted
in DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 3, at 433.
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Experience by demaining workers in the developing world has shown
that it does not take very many landmines in agricultural zones to
frighten farmers from bringing all but minimal acreage back into
production." Landmines, in this regard, are a perfect terror weapon:
because they are unseen, they could be anywhere, even where they are
not. Thus, even a few mines can have great effects; in military jargon,
concealed mines become a "force multiplier."
Landmines have these effects because they are dela;ed-action weapons that do not require an operator to detonate. A landmine left by
combatants remains live, often for decades; it does not cease operating
just because the battle is over, or because combat is over in a given
locality, or because the war is over. A landmine is a "silent sentinel"
that never sleeps and is always on alert; unlike a rifleman, however, it
"cannot distinguish between the footfall of a soldier and that of an old
16
woman gathering firewood."'
These insidious features have always been characteristic of landmines,
including those used in the First and Second World Wars. Since the
1970s, though, First World armies have developed the technological
capability to deliver staggering amounts of landmines by such "remote
delivery systems" as aircraft and artillery shell. 17 These systems permit
landmines to be seeded over many kilometers in vast quantities-what
might have taken a World War II platoon all day to emplace by hand
can now be done from the air within seconds.' 8 These mine-laying
systems contaminate whole zones, and do not allow for mapping of
individual mine locations. 19
But the vast majority of mines used during the past fifteen yearsaccounting for most of the world's 100 million or so currently emplaced mines-have been ordinary mines hand-deployed by guerrilla
and counterinsurgency armies. 20 These armies have found a cheap,
reliable, endlessly available weapon, and have recognized that it is ideal
not only for perimeter control, but also as a weapon for attacking whole
civilian populations. Mines have become useful for driving civilians off
the land, for destroying agricultural infrastructure, and for creating
flows of refugees-in effect, turning vast areas of countryside into
battlefields where civilians are the targets.

15. See DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 3, at 132-34.
16. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 3, at 3.
17. Richard H. Johnson, Why Mines? A Military Perspective, in CLEARING THE FIs.DS, supra
note 3, at 32-34; DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 3, at 26-27
18. See DEADLY LEGACY, surpra note 3, at 26-27.
19. See id. at 26-27.
20. Paul J. Lightfoot, Comment, Comment: The Impending Failureof the Landmine Review Conference,
18 FORDHAZA INT'L L.J. 1596, 1528-29 (1995).
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Thus, landmines are no longer limited to tactical use on the battlefield; in developing countries, they have come to be employed more
as strategic weapons in the classic sense-not unlike better-known
weapons of mass destruction like nuclear arms. If key features of such
weapons include devastating large areas, targeting civilian populations,
and damaging the land for long periods of time, then landmines can
be regarded essentially as weapons of mass destruction that work in
21
slow motion.
The conversion of landmines from tactical uses to quasi-strategic
uses has largely resulted from their increased commodification. Although
mines can be manufactured with relatively low technology, only a
small percentage of the mines in use in the world today are built
locally.22 Recent research into landmine production and trade indicates
that the increase in the number of emplaced mines over the last fifteen
years has depended crucially on the availability of ample stocks on the
open market at prices low enough that combatants need not worry
much about supply or cost when deciding to deploy them. 23 The
landmines crisis, in other words, is created as much by supply and
export as it is by use. Indeed, it has become apparent that no solution
on the "consumption" or "user" side alone-whether international
legal rules on "proper" use of mines by combatants, or de-mining
operations after the fact--can conceivably substitute for the controls
needed on the "supply" side.
Thus, the use of landmines has become a crisis in the developing
world for several interlocking reasons. First, they are widespread and
increasing in both absolute number and rate of emplacement. Second,
they are an obstacle to solving many other agricultural, refugee, resettlement, economic, health, and environmental problems in developing
countries affected by armed conflict. Third, removing these mines is
an expensive precondition of development: though an average, lowtechnology mine costs between three and twenty dollars, the removal
of such mines, according to current United Nations estimates, runs
from 300 to 1,000 dollars per mine.24 At such costs, entire foreign aid

21. DEADLY LEGACY, stgpra note 3, at 11-12.
22. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 21 ('While it is true that unsophisticated mines can be
made locally by virtually any combatant, ... [flew of the combatants in today s wars make their
own mines in any but minor circumstances ....").
23. See DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 3, at 35-106.
24. HIDDEN I ssLLas
II, supra note 3, at 1; DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 3, at 251. If the
above figure seems as astonishing as it is alarming, it should be borne in mind that it is based
on the full cost of U.N. demining programs in Afghanistan and Cambodia, and is intended to
capture the full indirect costs of mine clearance. These include transportation, training, at least
rudimentary medivac operations, and a host of other "hidden" costs. These costs must be
internalized to produce an accurate estimate of clearance costs. It is likely that if clearance were
undertaken on a much broader basis worldwide, certain recurring costs, particularly in centralized
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budgets could be eaten up without even beginning to solve the problem.
Demining is slow and dangerous, because it usually requires a
person with a prod to move centimeter by centimeter through the
soil. 25 Few experts believe that technological advances will drastically
improve the pace of de-mining efforts anytime soon, though there are
surely improvements to be made in mine detection technology. Most
mine detection has progressed little beyond the basic metal detector,
which has become less useful as mines are made with lower and lower
metal content. The costs of de-mining are likely to remain huge, when
such operations are undertaken at all, because progress is measured not
in square kilometers, but in square meters.
III. CURRENT EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE LANDMINES
PROBLEM
Efforts to deal with the calamity of landmines can be divided into
"front-end" or "supply-side" proposals, which attempt to regulate the
supply, availability, and cost of mines, and "back-end" or "end-user"
proposals concerned both with the ways mines are used in conflict
zones, and with post-conflict demining.
A. HumanitarianMine Clearance
With regard to the roughly 100 million mines already emplaced,
there is no alternative to undertaking the process of demining, especially in places that are infested with them, such as Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola, or Iraqi Kurdistan. One immediate difficulty, of
course, is that in several of these places, armed conflict continues, and
areas that have been demined at vast cost are often remined by combatants. Even when there exists a reasonable certainty that fighting is
over for the time being, cost and the limitations of equipment ensure
that detaining will be a long-running activity. Calls have been made
in the United Nations for the establishment of an international fund
for humanitarian mine clearance, and the United States in the past has
26
shown some willingness to contribute unilaterally to such efforts,
infrastructure, would fll. On the other hand, the possibilities for bringing costs down through
economies of scale are relatively limited, because "production"--i.e., mine clearance--is never a
centrally located activity: it always takes place in vastly varied conditions, each with its own
special "cost centers." The economics of mine clearance has been an unfortunately understudied
topic to date.
25. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 3, at 237.
26. Thomas E. McNamara, The U.S. Approach Toward Land Mine, in CLEARING THE FiELDs,
stupra note 3, at 60, 62-63, Cyrus Vance & Herbert S.Okun, Eliminatingthe Threat of Landiner,
in id. at 198, 202-05.
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though future contributions are in doubt given the 1994 U.S. Congressional election results. But the general consensus is that demining,
while vitally necessary, can never be enough to control an expanding
problem.

B. New Restraints on Use and the Landmines Protocol
Another focus of attempts to control the spread of mines through
end-use restrictions is the so-called 'Landmines Protocol"-Protocol II
of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons.27 This is the only
international treaty specifically addressing landmines, and it has never
been widely accepted (the United States, for example, has failed to
ratify it). The Landmines Protocol by its terms came up for review on
its tenth anniversary, and an international conference is being planned
for this autumn at which various amendments to the Protocol (as well
as to the Convention as a whole) will be debated. The formal review
conference is being preceded by a series of experts' meetings during
1994 and 1995.28
The current Landmines Protocol is widely acknowledged to be a
very weak document. 29 Parts of it appear to give even less protection
to civilians than the general laws of war as contained in, for example,
1977 Additional Protocol J.30 The Landmines Protocol attempts to
provide modest guidance to military forces in the "responsible" use of
landmines, but even this is almost completely swallowed up by its
deference to military necessity. Also, by its terms the Protocol does
not apply to internal wars, but only to international armed conflicts. 31
Despite widespread agreement that the Landmines Protocol has been
a resounding failure, the upcoming Review Conference seems to be
27. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other
Devices (Protocol II) of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, opened for signature April 10, 1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 19 I.L.M. 1523.
28. For a comprehensive examination of the Review Conference and its limitations, seegenerally
Lightfoot, supra note 20.
29. See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, The HumanitarianLaw Outlook, in CLEARING THE FIELDS, supra
note 3, at 45, 58 ("much can be done to make the Landmines Protocol better").
30. For example, the Landmines Protocol's limitations on indiscriminate use of landmines
appear to be inconsistent with and farweaker than the general prohibition on indiscriminate
attack found in article 51 of 1977 Additional Protocol 1, which (unlike the Landmines Protocol)
makes clear that an "attack" by landmines includes accidental detonations by civilians after the
immediate battle is ended. See discussion in DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 3, at 286-91. Understood in this way, article 51'sprohibition on indiscriminate attacks include a prohibition on such
accidental, post-war "attacks" on civilians, whereas nothing in the Landmines Protocol contemplates such. See DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 3, at 306-10.

31. See Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
art. 1. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 3, app. 3. The Landmines Protocol, Protocol 1I, is covered
by the Convention's "scope of application."
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headed down a similar road, judging by the proceedings of its experts'
meetings. The Review Conference appears to be repeating many of the
same mistakes that the original drafters of the Landmines Protocol
committed in the 1970s. Chief among these is the notion that the
landmines crisis can be overcome through legal measures prescribing
"proper" and "improper" uses of mines. Ten years after the Landmines
Protocol entered into force, the inadequacy of this regulatory approach
is plain. Nevertheless, under pressure from the world's militaries, who
repeatedly claim that they cannot function without mines, the Review
Conference appears unwilling at this date to contemplate anything
beyond tinkering with the rules for landmine use. 32 Given its current
trajectory, the Conference will likely do little more than extend an
inadequate and unworkable set of rules to cover internal wars. Ten
years from now, when the revised Landmines Protocol again comes up
for review, the landmines crisis could well be beyond any real control,
for the sheer accumulation of mines in the developing world may dwarf
any attempts at cleanup.
C. Technological "Fixes" and Self-Neutralizing Mines
Many military technologists, including those who genuinely desire
a solution to the mines crisis, have urged that because (1) militaries,
regular and irregular, will not give up mines and (2) no rules on use
will constrain illegal use, the best solution to the crisis is a change in
technology to alter the nature of mines. If the main problem of mines
is that they remain live in the field year after year, decade after decade,
then an obvious option is to furnish the market with mines that
contain devices to either "self-destruct" the mine or "self-neutralize"
33
it after a given amount of time has passed.
This proposal has attractive features, and the world would likely be
better off if the mines deployed had these features. On the other hand,
there are several reasons why the "self-neutralizing" option alone cannot solve the mines crisis. First, it has not yet been persuasively shown
that the self-neutralizing mechanisms work sufficiently well to relieve

32. For the attitudes of the world's militaries towards mines, see International Committee
of the Red Cross, Report of the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross for the Review Conference
of the 1980 United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have IndiscriminateEffects
(I.C.R.C.: Geneva 1994) [hereinafter ICRC Review Conference Report], Annex II, summarizing
meetings held with military experts to obtain their views on the military necessity of mines. The
conventional wisdom that landmines are vital to military forces has been challenged repeatedly,
including by a U.S. study conducted by outside consultants. See Lightfoot, supra note 20, at 1531

n.42.
33. See DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 3, at 344-46.
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the problem; this point is hotly debated between military engineers
and demining experts.3
Second, and probably more important, it is far from clear that
developing world countries are interested in self-neutralizing landmines;
many of them want long-emplaced mines for a variety of military
reasons. Many developing world countries are engaged in long-term
counterinsurgency wars in which landmines are purposely deployed for
use over years. Moreover, many developing world countries use landmines as permanent defensive fields for military installations in the
field. They have little interest in, for example, NATO military doctrine
in which landmines are deemed hazardous rather than useful after just
a few days.
Third and most important, self-neutralizing mines are more expensive than ordinary mines, as they often contain sophisticated microchip
technology. Developing countries naturally worry about increased costs;
also, many countries with local arms industries see the attempt to
impose a global standard of self-neutralizing mines as a way for the
First World to undercut their arms markets. In this view, the First
World will likely seek to use the new standard as a ploy to regain
market share, exploiting its advantage in technology to overcome the
developing world's advantage of cheap labor in the market for land35
mines.
D. National Moratoria on Production or Export
A gradually increasing number of countries are seeking to get ahead
of the slow pace of multilateral processes by enacting national moratoria on the production of landmines, the export of landmines, or both.
This approach has the virtue of recognizing the need to attack the
landmines problem from the "supply" end as well as the "use" end.
The United States was one of the first to adopt an export moratorium
in 1992; other countries, such as Belgium, have gone further and
36
enacted bans on production.
These national moratoria are of great importance, even though in
most cases they have been undertaken by countries that were not active
players in the export market to begin with. (Italy and South Africa are
two prominent exceptions to this rule.) The fact that NATO states
have voluntarily restricted flows of the weapon gives them far greater
34. Id.
35. Id. at 346.

36. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 3, at 319-31. Since publication of DEADLY LEGACY, other
countries such as Italy, Sweden, and South Africa have undertaken moratoria of one kind or the
other; Human Rights Watch serves as a clearing house for information on these measures on a
current basis.
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moral status to encourage international measures to do the same. On
the other hand, developing countries that do have significant mines
exports-among them, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Pakistan, and Singaporehave shown little appetite so far for curbing exports through national
37
moratoria.
E. InternationalExport Control
Another supply side approach to the problem would be to seek an
international export control regime, modelled to some degree on the
relatively successful missile technology export control regime. The
United States has been a particular champion of this approach; many
of its chief actors on landmines questions, both in the State Department and the Pentagon, believe that this and other arms control
approaches will ultimately bear far greater fruit than the existing
laws-of-war approaches that emphasize controls on use. 38
This attention to supply-side measures is certainly welcome. It is
doubtful, however, that an international export control regime can be
successfully modelled on the missile technology regime. Unlike missile
technology, landmine technology is freely and widely available. The
missile technology control regime has succeeded because only the
members of the "club" possess the requisite technology to build missiles. These countries can admonish others to "Do as I say, not as I do,"
since they control the necessary means. The regime can only'function
because of the difficulties of acquiring the technology to join the
missile "club."
With landmines, no such exclusive "club" is possible, because most
countries already have the technology needed to produce landmines.
The United States is, in effect, proposing that it and its allies should
be allowed to have landmines, because they will use them "responsibly," whereas other armies will not, and therefore should not have
landmines. But the "Do as I say, not as I do" maxim cannot serve here,
because everyone already has the weapons and the ability to make
them.
To break this impasse, the United States should take the moral high
ground by halting landmine production and divesting itself of its
remaining stocks. A resolute stand of this kind would demonstrate
moral leadership, and convince other countries to join the ban. Without such a measure, it is doubtful that any export control regime can
hope to succeed.

37. See DEADLY LEGAcyr, supra note 3, at 104.
38. See CLEAMN'G THE FIELDS, supra note 3, at 60-65, 87-96.
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F An InternationalBan
The international campaign to ban landmines advocates a complete
ban on use as well as supply-in other words, an absolute prohibition
on production, stockpiling, transfer and use.39 This has been endorsed
as an ultimate goal by the International Committee of the Red Cross,
the Secretary General of the United Nations, and numerous editorialists. It has not, however, gathered significant momentum among states,
either because they consider it unrealistic, or because of opposition
from their own militaries.
The call to ban landmines outright can be criticized as utopian in
the worst possible way, as an exercise that diverts attention from more
serious and realistic attempts at control. This is not an unreasonable
criticism; reform initiatives in international law have often turned out
to be purely paper exercises. Nonetheless, in the case of landmines, the
push for a comprehensive ban is by far the most sensible policy
alternative.
First, it is apparent that the other extant approaches, whether supply-side or user-side, each have serious weaknesses. Whether singly or
together they are capable of resolving the crisis is at best a serious
question.
Second, seeking a comprehensive ban is not inconsistent with any
of the other approaches if they are treated as interim measures toward
a total ban. Indeed, they are worthy avenues to pursue in and of
themselves.
Third, the nature of landmines is such that it is unlikely that they
will be taken seriously in relation to the damage they cause unless the
entire weapon is treated as non grata-stigmatizedas a morally unacceptable weapon for all parties. It is not possible to morally stigmatize
a whole weapon if it is considered acceptable for some combatants and
not for others. Landmines should be treated like chemical and biological weapons, with the same moral disapproval attached, but this cannot
happen except by means of a complete ban for all parties.
Fourth, the idea of a ban is not proposed as part of some utopian
fantasy that landmines will no longer be made or traded or used in
the world. Proponents of a total ban understand that even in the face
of the best efforts to delegitimate the weapon, rogue countries will
still sell and use landmines. But total compliance is not the issue. It
is, instead, a matter of how most effectively to raise the cost of
landmines to end-users in the field. A large part of what constitutes
the "crisis" in landmines arises from the fact that they are a pure
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commodity-cheap and available to any combatant in limitless supply.
Raising the price of landmines in order to force combatants to think
about scarcity of resources is the realistic point of a ban.
No one knows how many participants can be persuaded out of the
market for landmines. No one knows how many participants must
drop out of the market in order that the remaining rogue participants
will charge a perverse but critical premium for the product--one that
monetizes the political cost of continuing to engage in a politically
disapproved business and that begins to capture a quasi-monopoly
premium. No one knows how high that premium must rise in order
sufficiently to affect the price of mines so as to affect behavior of
combatants. But that is just the point-no one knows the answers to
these basic questions of how to affect the market for end-users of
mines.
Whereas what is known is this: that raising the cost to end-users
depends crucially on creating an international atmosphere of universal
ill-will toward those who produce, stockpile, transfer, and use landmines.
It is a proposition of morality, and the only way to make that clear
and convincing to the world is to express it as a complete ban.
measures short of that, although perhaps useful interim steps, cannot
give a sufficiently strong moral and political message, and hence have
no chance of imposing a sufficiently high cost to alter combatant
40
behavior. This is not the counsel of utopianism, but realism.

40. It is evident from the above where the authors' sympathies lie. We wish to acknowledge
and thank our friends in the landmines ban campaign (many of whom are responsible for
researching the most basic facts on landmines, their use, spread, cost, and market) and especially
Stephen D. Goose, Aryeh Neier, and Jody Williams.

